Several studies on the expiration of IPO lockups document a strong negative reaction even though the unlock event is devoid of any informational content. The empirical finding has remained a conundrum. In this paper, we find that changes in liquidity can account for the observed stock price reaction around lockup expiration. Specifically, firms which show improvement in liquidity subsequent to the unlock day experience positive abnormal returns in the post-expiration period, and vice versa. Another interesting conclusion that emerges from our research is that liquidity changes can predict future abnormal returns. Our results remain robust to the use of alternate procedures to characterize unexpected changes in liquidity. 
Introduction
As volumes of new research papers in financial economics are produced, we glean fresh insights into the workings of financial markets. Paradoxically, researchers frequently uncover fresh conundrums. The focus in our paper is on the pioneering work of Field and Hanka (2001) , which documents the puzzling negative stock price reaction at lock-up expiration of U.S. IPOs. The significant negative reaction at lockup expiration has remained an enigma since the event is devoid of informational content. This is because the exact unlock date is known to market participants well before the actual occurrence.
Several researchers have studied this phenomenon with a view to explaining this effect using the standard paradigms of financial economics. However, until now the finding has defied a rational explanation.
We contribute to this growing literature by offering an explanation based on unexpected liquidity changes following lock-up expiration. In the remainder of this section, we first explain the rationale for lockups and summarize the key findings of prior research. We then posit that earlier explanations leave room for further analysis, and subsequently proceed to highlight the key elements of our approach along with a preview of our results and contribution.
Most IPOs in the U.S. feature lockup agreements that prohibit insiders and other Pre-IPO investors from selling their shares for a specified period of time, typically 180 days.
Lockups are not mandated by regulators but are contractual agreements between underwriters and issuers and the terms of the lockup are explicitly disclosed in the IPO prospectus. Financial economists have offered three distinct rationales for the existence of lockups -a signalling solution to the adverse problem, a contracting solution to the moral hazard problem, and a rent extraction mechanism by powerful underwriters.
Empirical evidence regarding the signalling hypothesis is mixed with Brav and Gompers (2003) rejecting it while Brau, Lambson, and McQueen (2003) find empirical support for it. Brav and Gompers (2003) suggest that lockups serve as a commitment mechanism for the moral hazard problem. They do not find any evidence to support the rent extraction hypothesis.
Empirical evidence regarding effects of lockup expiration have been documented by Field and Hanka (2001) and Bradley, Jordan, Yi and Roten (2001) . There is overwhelming evidence of a significant negative stock price reaction at lockup expiration. These researchers also document a concomitant increase in the trading volume after the unlock day. The finding of negative stock price reaction challenges the more extreme versions of the efficient markets hypothesis.
Several hypotheses have been proffered to explain the negative stock price reaction.
First, the negative return at lockup expiration could be a statistical artifact caused by an increase in the proportion of trades executed at the bid price. Second, price pressure effects could be depressing the stock prices. Third, an increase in trading costs could be impacting the stock prices due to an increase in the required rate of return. Fourth, stock prices could be lower due to a downward sloping demand curve for stocks. Finally, a larger than expected sales by insiders could be depressing the stock prices. Field and Hanka (2001) rule out the first two explanations by conducting specific empirical tests.
Studies that focus on the market microstructure effects of lockup expiration such as Cao, Field and Hanka (2004) , Krishnamurti and Thong (2008) and Gao (2005) do not find evidence of increase in bid-ask spreads following lockup expiration. There is no evidence indicating an increase in information asymmetry following lockup expiration that necessitates an increase in the required rate of return. The downward sloping demand curve hypothesis is ruled out by the evidence of Bradley, Jordan, Yi and Roten (2001) who show that CARs are negative and statistically significant even for the subsample of stocks that have lower trading volume after unlock day as compared to the lockup period. Finally, Field and Hanka (2001) find that abnormal return is significantly negative even when no insider sales are reported. Thus we can conclude that the negative stock price reaction is not driven by worse-than-expected insider sales.
Summing up, extant research does not offer a complete explanation regarding the negative stock price reaction at lockup expiration. The existing literature leaves two significant lacunae regarding the impact of lockup expiration on stock prices. First, the finding of negative stock price reaction at lockup expiration challenges the more extreme versions of efficient markets hypothesis as it does not address the question as to how the events of the unlock day could be consistently worse than expected. Second, prior work has not examined the linkage between market microstructure effects of lockup expiration and cumulative abnormal returns in the periods surrounding lockup expiration.
We remedy these issues in the literature by pursuing an explanation based on changes in liquidity in the post-lockup period. We posit that liquidity improves for some firms but deteriorates for other firms in the post-lockup period. Thus the observed stock price reaction should be conditioned on changes in liquidity. Using Amihud's illiquidity measure to characterize changes in liquidity in the post-lockup period, we document a statistically significant association between deterioration in liquidity and cumulative abnormal returns. Our results are robust to alternative ways of characterizing changes in liquidity. Additionally, we find that liquidity changes can predict future abnormal returns.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief review of the literature and the theory that motivates our study. Section 3 describes our sample and provides summary statistics. Our principal empirical results are discussed in Section 4.
We provide robustness checks by using alternate procedures to characterize liquidity changes in Section 5. In Section 6, we examine the ability of liquidity changes to predict future stock returns. Our conclusions are contained in the final section.
Literature Review

Current Explanations of Lockup Expiration Effects
Several hypotheses have been offered to potentially explain the observed negative abnormal returns around lockup expiration. We describe them below and summarize the empirical evidence regarding their validity.
(a) Statistical Artifact Hypothesis:
If transactions around unlock day tend to be predominantly sell orders generated by insiders that are executed at the bid, then transaction prices around unlock day will be spuriously negative, even if there is no change in bid or ask prices. Field and Hanka (2001) show empirical evidence that indicates that abnormal returns around unlock day is driven by permanent, parallel drops in both the bid and ask prices. The abnormal return is not driven by a change in the proportion of trades that occur at the bid price.
(b) Price Pressure Hypothesis:
One of the hypotheses offered to explain the negative abnormal return around lockup expiration is the price pressure hypothesis. On the unlock day share prices may be temporarily depressed due to a large flow of sell orders. Thus a temporary price drop is necessary in equilibrium to attract liquidity providers. Field and Hanka (2001) show that the abnormal return reaction around unlock day is permanent with no rebound in subsequent weeks. Thus the price pressure hypothesis is rejected.
(c) Increase in Trading Cost Hypothesis:
Another possible explanation for the negative sock price reaction during the post lockup period is an increase in trading costs due to a potential increase in information asymmetry due to insider selling activity. Field and Hanka (2001) find little evidence of a meaningful increase in quoted bid-ask spreads after the unlock day. Cao, Field and Hanka (2004) study the trading cost hypothesis in greater detail. They report that despite considerable insider trading for some IPO firms, there is little impact on effective spreads.
In fact, two other liquidity measures -quoted depth and trading activity increase substantially. Furthermore, they report the interesting finding that in cases where insiders disclose share sales spreads actually decline. Krishnamurti and Thong (2008) report that both insider selling and unwinding by venture capitalists in the aftermath of lockup expiration are associated with a decline in quoted and effective spreads. Furthermore, they attribute the decline in spreads to a decline in the adverse selection component of spreads. Similar evidence is provided by Gao (2005) who shows that the information asymmetry of IPO stocks experience little change after the unlock day.
(d) Downward Sloping Demand Curve Hypothesis:
This hypothesis is based on the assumption that demand curves for stocks slope downward. Practitioners allude to this effect as the "scarcity premium" for IPOs with small public float. On lockup expiration day, the public float of stocks increase permanently as insiders unload their holdings. The demand curve effect posits a negative stock price reaction. The Downward Sloping Demand Curve hypothesis differs from the price pressure effect in that the former is a permanent effect while the latter is caused by a temporary increase in the flow of sell orders.
Empirical evidence regarding Downward Sloping Demand Curve hypothesis is mixed. Field and Hanka (2001) report that abnormal return around the unlock day is significantly more negative the larger the fraction of outstanding shares that are locked up. But further tests do not lend support to the Downward Sloping Demand Curve hypothesis. Sixty percent of the sub-sample of firms where the total three-day trading volume is less than 1% of the public float, experience negative abnormal returns. In the case of firms whose three-day trading volume is below their own pre-unlock mean volume, the corresponding three-day abnormal return is still significantly negative.
(e) High Unexpected Insider Sales Hypothesis:
Insider sales are expected to elicit negative stock price reaction since they reflect a lack of insider confidence and suggest a reduction in insiders' incentives to maximize firm value. Field and Hanka (2001) study the abnormal return of the sub-sample of firms that report insider sales to SEC during the 2-week period centred on the unlock day.
They find statistically significant negative abnormal returns. However, even for the subsample with no reported insider sales, the abnormal return remains significantly negative.
Thus we conclude that the abnormal return on unlock day is probably not driven solely by unexpectedly high insider sales.
Unfortunately, none of the hypotheses examined by prior researchers gives us a rational explanation of the preponderantly negative stock price reaction observed at lockup expiration. We are left with two alternatives -(i) conclude that the negative abnormal stock price reaction is an anomaly unexplained by rational investor behavior or
(ii) pursue an alternative explanation grounded in investor rationality. We follow the latter approach, basing our explanation on changes in liquidity of IPO issues after the unlock day. Our approach is elucidated in the following subsection.
An Alternative View of Liquidity
Our explanation of the lockup expiration effect on stock prices is based on changes in liquidity. We argue that lockup expiration is an event that alters the liquidity characteristics of IPO firms. These changes in liquidity arise from the selling of corporate insiders, venture capitalists and others that were explicitly prohibited from selling their holdings prior to the unlock day. We posit that the change in liquidity after the unlock day for a given stock is partially unpredictable. Specifically, the market's perception of information asymmetry following lockup expirations would depend on ex ante expectations of whether insiders have private information. These expectations would vary in the cross-section but would be difficult to measure using publicly available variables prior to lockup expirations. Thus, sales by insiders after lockup expiration may be interpreted as an increase in information asymmetry only in some cases. Firms that experience unexpected increases in information asymmetry would experience a deterioration in liquidity while other firms may experience an improvement in liquidity.
An unexpected deterioration in market liquidity should lower contemporaneous stock prices. This is due to the fact that higher realized illiquidity raises expected illiquidity.
This in turn raises the expected stock returns and lowers stock prices. Thus our principal hypothesis is that stocks which experience deterioration in liquidity, should experience negative abnormal returns at lockup expiration. For stocks which show no perceptible change, there should be no significant stock price reaction. Stocks which exhibit improvements in liquidity should consequently experience positive abnormal reaction after the unlock day.
One of the major hurdles in implementing a test of our hypothesis is a precise definition of liquidity. According to Amihud (2002) "liquidity is an elusive concept".
There are several dimensions of liquidity. Illiquidity can be characterized as the price impact of order flow. For standard-size transactions, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) show that bid-ask spread is a good measure of price impact. When excess demand or excess supply is large bid-ask spread is not a good measure of price impact. Kyle (1985) and Silber (1975) developed other measures of illiquidity that could be useful under situations of excess demand or excess supply. Kyle (1985) develops the price impact measure, λ, which has been extensively applied in market microstructure research. Silber (1975) employs a measure of thinness which is defined as the ratio of absolute price change to absolute excess demand for trading.
Liquidity has a price dimension and a quantity dimension. Furthermore, liquidity can also be measured based on the informativeness of transactions. Thus it is possible that the lockup expiration event has positive impact on some measures of liquidity but negative effect on other measures of liquidity for a given stock. A further difficulty arises from the fact that several measures of liquidity developed by financial economists require detailed tick-by-tick data on quotes and trades of the stocks. In the real world, traders may not have real-time access or the time to process such detailed information in order to detect a change in liquidity of a given stock. Thus we need an easy to compute measure that is sufficiently comprehensive.
A thorough search of the literature led us to Amihud's illiquidity measure as the most suitable measure for our purpose. We are encouraged to use this measure due to the following two reasons. First, Amihud's illiquidity measure is strongly positively related to Kyle's λ, a price impact measure and ψ, the fixed cost component related to the bidasked spread. Second, Amihud's illiquidity measure has substantial explanatory power to explain returns in an asset pricing model framework with illiquidity as a priced factor.
Finally, Amihud (2002) shows that illiquidity affects small stocks more strongly than large firms thus accounting for the time series variation in their premiums.
Amihud (2002) defined his measure of illiquidity as follows:
where R it is the return on stock i on day t. VOLD it is the dollar volume for stock i on day t. D represents the number of days over which the ILLIQ measure is computed. This measure is interpreted as the average daily stock price reaction to a dollar of trading volume. Amihud (2002) shows that this measure of expected market illiquidity has a positive and significant effect on ex ante stock excess returns. Amihud (2002) further validates his measure by showing that ILLIQ is related to Kyle's λ and ψ the fixed cost component related to the bid-ask spread.
Lockup expiration is accompanied by potential increases in insider selling and unloading of shares by venture capitalists. These investors were prohibited from doing so in the pre-expiration period. Thus the lockup expiration event is likely to significantly alter the informativeness of trades, especially in those cases when a lot of insider selling takes place. In other cases, liquidity may improve simply due to the larger float of available shares. Therefore, the lockup expiration event is likely to affect the liquidity characteristics of stocks. In particular, we expect that some stocks will become more liquid after expiration while others may become less liquid. Ex ante, it would be very difficult to predict the changes in liquidity of an individual stock after the lockup expiration. In the framework of Amihud (2002), changes in liquidity should have an impact on the value of the firm. This is the primary motivation of our paper.
Data and Sample Characteristics
The For each IPO, we also retrieve the trade and quote data from the NYSE's TAQ database, and omit the following to minimize data errors: (1) quotes if either the ask price or bid price is less than or equal to zero; (2) quotes if either the ask size or the bid size is less than or equal to zero; (3) quotes if the bid price is greater than or equal to the ask price; (4) quotes if the bid-ask spread is greater than $5; (5) before-the-open and afterthe-close trades and quotes; (6) trades if the price or volume is less than or equal to zero;
(7) out-of-sequence trades and quotes. In Panel B of Table 1 , we compare the offer and firm characteristics of sub samples based on liquidity changes. We split the sample into two groups on the basis of changes in liquidity in the post-lockup period as compared to the pre-lockup period. Firms whose ratio of Amihud illiquidity measure in the post-lockup [+21,+ 40] to pre-lockup [-40,-21] period is less than 1 are classified as liquid firms (LIQ). 2 Firms with ratios exceeding one are considered as illiquid firms (ILLIQ). We find that most of the offer and firm characteristics of the two sub samples are similar. However, there are a few differences between the two subsamples. On average, LIQ firms tend to have a larger quantity of over-allotment shares and a higher number of underwriters. LIQ firms generally have lower leverage as compared to ILLIQ firms. When we look at the entire sample, we find that on average, quoted and effective dollar spreads reduce significantly in the post-lockup period as compared to the pre-lockup period. When, we examine the quoted and effective spreads, we notice a statistically significant increase in the post-expiration window as compared to the pre-expiration period. We thus conclude that dollar spread decreases by less than the decrease in stock prices resulting in a marginal increase in percentage spreads. Total depth and its constituents, bid depth and ask depth increase substantially in the post-lockup period as compared to the period prior to the unlock day. The number of quotes recorded registers a substantial increase in the post-lockup period.
A similar pattern emerges when we examine the trade activities in the post-lockup period and compare them with the pre-lockup period. The number of trades, trade size and trading value all show statistically significant increases in the post-lockup period as compared to the pre-lockup expiration period. However, the mean return volatility does not change significantly in the post-lockup expiration period.
We next compare the market microstructure variables of the LIQ subsample during the pre-and post-lockup expiration periods. Several interesting facts emerge. First, while quoted and effective dollar spreads decline in the post-lockup period as observed in the overall sample, the quoted and effective percentage spreads also decline. This is in direct contrast to our findings for the overall sample. It appears that there is a more than proportionate decline in dollar spreads as compared to the change in average stock prices in the post-lockup period. Similar to our findings for the overall sample, we document increases in depth, number of quotes, number of trades, trade size, and trading value in the post-lockup period as compared to the pre-lockup period. Second, our result for return volatility comparisons of the LIQ subsample is different from that observed for the overall sample. We find that return volatility declines substantially in the post-lockup period for the LIQ subsample while the overall sample showed no change.
We then compare the market microstructure variables of our ILLIQ subsample during the pre-and post-lockup expiration periods. We notice several differences as compared to the LIQ subsample. There is no change in the quoted dollar spread in the post-lockup period as compared to the pre-lockup period. There is a slight decrease in the effective dollar spread in the post-lockup period. Both quoted and effective percentage spreads show statistically significant increases in the post-lockup period as compared to preunlock period. This finding is exactly opposite to our finding for the LIQ subsample.
There is no significant change in depth after the expiration of lockup. A number of trade related microstructure variables clearly show a significant deterioration during the postlockup period. The number of trades, trade size and trading value all decline significantly in the post-lockup period as compared to the pre-lockup period. Return volatility increases significantly in the post-lockup period as compared to the pre-lockup period signifying a deteriorating trading environment.
Finally, we compare the key market microstructure variables across the LIQ and ILLIQ subsamples during our pre-and post-lockup windows. First, we perform comparisons during the pre-lockup period. We do not find compelling evidence that the liquidity characteristics of the two subsamples are substantially different during the prelockup expiration period. However, four out of the twelve variables examines show that the LIQ subsample is more liquid than the ILLIQ subsample. These are: quoted percentage spread, effective percentage spread,, number of quotes, and return volatility.
For the eight other variables studied, the liquidity characteristics of the two subsamples are statistically indistinguishable.
Next, we compare the liquidity characteristics of the two subsamples during the postlockup period. We find a striking difference between the two subsamples. For every measure we examine, we find that the LIQ subsample shows better liquidity than the ILLIQ subsample. This implies that our procedure has done an excellent job of identifying a subset of stocks that underwent significant liquidity deterioration in the post-lockup period.
The above comparisons show that Amihud's illiquidity measure is strongly related to traditional market microstructure measures used in prior research. Furthermore it appears that a subset of firms (ILLIQ) experience a drastic deterioration in liquidity in the post unlock period.
Empirical Results
We use the standard event study methodology to examine stock market reaction to lockup expiration. The magnitude of the security price reactions are estimated using the market model with parameters estimated over days t = -120 to t=-21, where t=0 is the lockup expiration date. The CRSP value-weighted index return is the proxy for the market return.
We show results of event study results of lockup expiration in Table 3 . We show results of the overall sample and sub-samples based on liquidity changes. In conformity with earlier research, we document statistically significant negative CARs for the overall sample using several windows such as (-1,+1), (-5,+5), (-10,+10) and (-20,+20). On the expiration day, abnormal return averages -0.87% and is statistically significant at the 1% level. As we increase the window length CARs become more and more negative. For the (-20,+20) window, we report a CAR of -4.23%, significant at the 1% level. Median
CARs are generally smaller in magnitude but are all statistically significant. CARs in the post expiration windows of (+2, +5), (+2,+10) and (+2,+20) are not significantly different from zero.
We next segregate our sample into two groups based on post-expiration liquidity changes and examine the CARs for each of the windows. The CARs of liquid and illiquid firms differ dramatically from each other. 3 For the LIQ subsample CARs are negative and statistically significant at 1% level only for the (-1, +1) and (0,0) windows.
Other windows that include pre-expiration periods typically do not show significant CARs. Interestingly, CARs are significantly positive during the (+2, +5), (+2, +10) and (+2, +20) windows. The ILLIQ subsample shows significant negative CARs for all the 3 Since the validity of our study critically depends on the measurement of illiquidity we use the windows (-40,-21) and (+21,+40) as the pre-and post-lockup periods respectively. Our pre-and post-lockup windows exclude the (-20, +20) window that is used for computing the cumulative abnormal returns. This is done to eliminate potential spurious correlation between CARs and our illiquidity measure which contains stock returns in the numerator.
windows examined. Of particular interest is the long window of (-20, +20) where we document a CAR of -12.09% significant at the 1% level. All post expiration windows show significantly negative CARs.
A noteworthy finding of our study is the vastly divergent CAR pattern observed during the post-expiration windows for the LIQ and ILLIQ subsamples. The insignificant CAR results documented for the overall sample during the post expiration windows of (+2, +5), (+2, +10), and (+2, +20) is driven the combination of positive CARs of the LIQ subsample and the negative CARs of the ILLIQ subsample. When we compute the difference in CARs between the LIQ and ILLIQ subsamples for each of the windows studied, we observe that they are all positive and significant at the 1% level. Figure 1 graphically portrays the dramatic divergence in CARs for the ILLIQ an LIQ subsamples during the (-20, +20) period.
Having shown the relationship between CAR and liquidity changes in a univariate framework, we proceed to further tests utilizing a multivariate regression framework and report the results in Table 4 . We first regress CARs in the (-20, +20) window on a set of variables used in prior research in addition to three other variables: DILLIQ, OI and indicates an increase in the illiquidity of the stock in the post-expiration window of (+21, +40) as compared to pre-expiartion window of (-21, -40). Thus we expect an increase in DILLIQ to be accompanied by a decrease in stock returns. OI measures the cumulative sell side order imbalance during the window surrounding lockup expiration. As such, it is expected to have a negative impact on CAR. SUPPLY quantifies the increase in trading volume during the window surrounding unlock day. An increase in SUPPLY represents an increase in the floating stock of shares and is indicative of an improvement in liquidity. We therefore expect this variable to have a positive effect on CAR.
As expected, DILLIQ has a negative impact on CAR and remains significant even when other variables are included in the regression. This result shows that an increase in the illiquidity of a stock is associated with a negative stock price reaction. We find that the dummy for VC-backing is associated with a statistically significant negative effect even after controlling for other determinants of stock price reaction. Insider selling is negative and mildly significant at conventional levels. Order Imbalance is associated with a negative stock price reaction and is significant at the 1% level. The supply effect is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level as per expectations. RUNUP represents the post-listing performance of stocks. RUNUP has a negative impact on CAR and is statistically significant at the 1% level. This implies that stocks which performed the best in the pre-expiration period suffer the worst stock price declines during the lockup expiration window. The TECH dummy shows a negative effect on CAR in univariate regression but the effect disappears in multivariate regressions. NYSE listing has a significant negative effect on CARs indicating that the stocks listed on NYSE experience more negative stock price reaction at lockup expiration as compared to Nasdaq stocks. Finally, underwriter reputation has no effect on CARs.
In Panel B, we report results of regressing CAR (+2,+20) on the independent variables of interest. The DILLIQ variable has a statistically significant negative impact on CAR indicating that firms experiencing a deterioration in liquidity also suffer negative CARs. The VC dummy has a negative effect and is statistically significant. The insider selling variable is not statistically significant. Order imbalance has a negative effect on CAR and is statistically significant. The supply variable has a positive effect on CAR and is statistically significant. RUNUP has a statistically significant negative effect on CAR as before. TECH, NYSE and UWREP are not statistically significant.
Note that in our univariate tests, INSIDE is associated with negative CARs. In multivariate regressions when we include DILLIQ, the significance of INSIDE tends to drop. We believe that there are two important reasons for the muted effect of insider sales on CAR. First, insiders could be selling soon after unlock day for one of three reasons: diversification of their holdings, to take advantage of their private information regarding future prospects of the firm, and to make use of their expectation of a decline in overall stock market prices. As pointed out in Section 2.2., the market's expectations about the relative likelihood of each of these possibilities are not observable prior to the lockup expiration, and are manifested in DILLIQ. Second, traders do not have timely information regarding insider sales since they are only required to disclose their trades via Form 4 no later than the tenth day of the month after transactions.
Overall, the most significant result from the multivariate regression analysis is that an increase in illiquidity is associated with a strongly negative stock price reaction. Our regression results confirm the earlier findings that VC-backed firms and those with reported insider selling experience significant negatively abnormal returns around lockup expiration. In addition we document that order imbalance has a significant negative impact on CAR while the supply effect is positive. Thus our empirical results suggest that the negative CAR documented at lockup expiration is associated with a deterioration in liquidity of a subset of stocks.
Robustness Checks
The empirical results shown in the previous section indicate that changes in liquidity are strongly negatively associated with CARs at the expiration of IPO lockups. In this section, we check the robustness of our results by conducting three additional sets of tests. First, we use an alternate measure of liquidity changes. Second, we use different windows for measuring pre-and post-lockup expiration periods. Finally, we use an alternate procedure for identifying liquidity changes.
Our first robustness check is based on the premise that there is no universally accepted measure of liquidity. We therefore construct our own index of liquidity The results of our robust regressions are reported in Table 5 . In Panel A, we show results using the (-20, +20) CAR window. We find that our constructed index of liquidity changes has a negative and statistically significant coefficient after controlling for control variables. We are thus able to confirm, by using an alternate measure of liquidity changes, that an increase in illiquidity is associated with negative stock returns in the period surrounding lockup expiration. In fact, our results are stronger with the constructed index as compared to Amihud's illiquidity measure.
In Panel B, we provide multivariate regression results using the (+2, +20) window for CAR. Once again, we are able to provide strong confirmatory evidence that an increase in illiquidity is associated with a decline in stock prices in the post-lockup window.
Barring minor changes, our principal conclusions remain unaltered.
Our second robustness checks involves repeating our analysis by using the (-20,-1) and (+1,+20) windows to denote pre-and post-lockup periods respectively. Our empirical results remain qualitatively unaltered 4 .
Our final robustness checks involve the use of a transition matrix framework to classify our sample stocks into groups based pre-and post-lockup illiquidity. We then compute CARs (-20, +20) for the cells of the transition matrix. For the firms that became illiquid (LIQ, ILLIQ) in the post-lockup period, CAR averages -12.57% and is significantly more negative than those firms with expected illiquidity (ILLIQ, ILLIQ).
Firms that became more liquid in the post-lockup period (ILLIQ, LIQ) experience positive CARs of 5.54% on average, which are statistically significant and higher than firms that are expected to be liquid. The fact that firms that experience improvements in liquidity show positive CARs is particularly noteworthy.
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Summing up, using our robustness checks involving three different methods, we are able to substantiate our primary result that changes in liquidity are strongly associated with the stock price reaction during the period surrounding lock-up expiration.
Can Liquidity Changes Predict CARs?
So far, we have demonstrated that liquidity changes are associated with CARs around lockup expiration. A related question is whether observed liquidity changes can predict future CARs. We address the issue below.
We measure liquidity changes during the pre-and post-lockup expiration windows of (-2, -10) and (+2, +10) and CARs during the (+11, +20) period. We conduct multivariate regressions using CAR as the dependent variable and ∆ILLIQ, where the latter represents illiquidity changes in the post-lockup period as the main independent variable. We use the same control variables as in Sections 4 and 5. The results are reported in Table 6 . In Model 1, we use Amihud measure for measuring illiquidity In summary, we show that liquidity changes can predict future stock returns subsequent to the measurement period. An implication of this finding is that stocks take a longer time to incorporate liquidity changes into prices.
Conclusion
Despite considerable research on the lockup expiration of IPOs, there remain few satisfactory explanations for the observed negative stock price reaction. Since the unlock event per se is devoid of any informational content, the empirical finding has remained a conundrum. Prior studies on the market microstructure effects around unlock day do not find any evidence regarding deterioration in liquidity.
Our contribution in this paper is two-fold. First, we show that a subset of firms experience deterioration in liquidity during the post-lock up period. Second, we show that this deterioration in liquidity is associated with negative CARs during the post-lock up period. Our results are robust to the use of alternate procedures to define changes in liquidity. Further research on the factors driving the observed deterioration in liquidity is likely to be a fruitful endeavour. [-40,-21] period is less than 1 (more than 1). Amihud illiquidity measure is computed as |R it |/DVOL it . Shares offered is the number of shares issued to the public by the issuers. Net proceeds is the total amount raised by the issuers excluding fees and expenses. Offer price is the issuing price of the IPO shares. Filing Price Range is defined as the difference between high and low filing price as a percentage of the low filing price. Offer to close returns is the difference between the closing price and offer price as a percentage of the offer price. Over-allotment shares represents the additional shares that issuer allows the underwriter to offer, typically 15% of the initial issue. The number of underwriters includes lead and co-lead manager in the IPO process. Lockup Days is the number of days that the insiders are prohibited from selling their shares in the aftermarket. Lockup shares are the number of shares held by the managers, executives and other investors which are restricted from selling during the lockup period. These are denoted as shares eligible for future sale in the IPO prospectus. Firm age is measured from the founding year to the IPO year. Shares outstanding represent the number of shares outstanding after IPO. Market value is defined as the first day closing price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding after IPO. The debt to asset ratio equals total debt divided by total assets. Total assets, total liabilities, net sales, net income and returns on assets (ROA) are based on the most recent fiscal year ending prior to the IPO lockup expiration. The mean and median comparisons of LIQ and ILLIQ samples are based on independent t-test and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test, respectively. *** , ** , and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for a two-tailed test, respectively. (-20,+20) and CAR(+2,+20) in panels A and B, respectively. CARs are based on the market model with the CRSP value-weighted index as the proxy for the market return and the estimation period runs from day -120 to day -21. VC is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is venture capital backed; otherwise zero. DILLIQ is the average ratio of Amihud illiquidity measure in the post-lockup (+40,+21) to prelockup (-21,-40) period. Amihud illiquidity measure is computed as |R it |/DVOL it . INSIDE is defined as the ratio of insider sales of shares in the period (0,+20) to the number of shares locked up. Insiders are directors, committees, officers, affiliates, and beneficial owners who are subject to lockup restrictions of investment bankers. OI is the order imbalance defined as the sum of (sell dollar volume -buy dollar volume)/daily trading value during the CAR window. SUPPLY is defined as the sum of (daily trading value -normal trading value)/normal trading value during (-20,+20) . Normal trading volume is computed based on the average daily trading value during day -120 to day -21. RUNUP the rate of return for each firm computed from the closing price on listing date to day -41. TECH refers to technology firms and is a dummy variable that equals 1 if identified as high tech in SDC database; otherwise zero. NYSE is equal to 1 if the firm is NYSE-listed; otherwise zero. UWREP is the underwriter reputation which equals to 1 if Jay Ritter's underwriter ranking is greater than 8; otherwise zero. (-20,+20) . CARs are based on the market model with the CRSP value-weighted index as the proxy for the market return and the estimation period is from day -120 to day -21. VC is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is venture capital backed; otherwise zero. ILLIQ_INDEX is computed based on the 5 variables: time-weighted percentage quoted spread, trade-weighted percentage effective spread, total trading hours divided number of trades, $1million divided dollar value of trade, and daily return volatility. We first compute the ratio of each variable in the post-lockup (+40,+21) to pre-lockup (-21,-40) period. We then compute the equally-weighted values based on the ratios. INSIDE is defined as the ratio of insider sales of shares in the period (0,+20) to the number of shares locked up. Insiders are directors, committees, officers, affiliates, and beneficial owners who are subject to lockup restrictions of investment bankers. OI is the order imbalance defined as the sum of (sell dollar volume -buy dollar volume)/daily trading value during the CAR window. SUPPLY is defined as the sum of (daily trading value -normal trading value)/normal trading value during (-20,+20) . Normal trading volume is computed based on the average daily trading value during day -120 to day -21. RUNUP the rate of return for each firm computed from the closing price on listing date to day -41. TECH refers to technology firms and is a dummy variable that equals 1 if identified as high tech in SDC database; otherwise zero. NYSE is equal to 1 if the firm is NYSE-listed; otherwise zero. UWREP is the underwriter reputation which equals to 1 if Jay Ritter's underwriter ranking is greater than 8; otherwise zero. t-value is in the parentheses. , and *** represent the 10%, 5%,
